A formal methodology for integral security design and verification of
  network protocols by Diaz, Jesus et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
1.
56
66
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  6
 Se
p 2
01
2
A formal methodology for integral security
design and verification of network protocols
Jesus Diaz, David Arroyo, Francisco B. Rodriguez
November 6, 2018
Abstract
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network
protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context
and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal represen-
tation and procedural verification. It is an iterative process where the
early steps are simpler than the last ones. Therefore, the effort required
for detecting flaws is proportional to the complexity of the associated at-
tack. Thus, we avoid wasting valuable resources for simple flaws that
can be detected early in the verification process. In order to illustrate
the advantages provided by our methodology, we also analyze three real
protocols.
1 Introduction
With this work we would like to promote dissemination of methodologies for
the verification of security properties of interactive protocols. It covers the
whole protocol design process, from the specification of the requirements and
the protocol environment, to the protocol definition and its validation. Such a
methodology will help avoiding errors due to wrong or no longer valid assump-
tions on the context in which the protocol is executed, while also preventing
design flaws that can lead to the non-fulfillment of the security requirements.
Indeed, there already exist plenty of tools for the formal analysis of those secu-
rity requirements [8, 4]. However, even though there exist automatic tools for
formal security verification, dedicating some time previous to this formal anal-
ysis to the task of defining a security context may help to detect some initial
(but important) flaws. This way, we also prevent an unnecessary waste of time
and improve the understanding of the protocol. Like we will see, an active ap-
plication of a methodology covering the whole design process will help reducing
the impact of illegitimate actions over the resulting network protocols.
The paper is structured as follows. We start in Sec. 2 with a brief in-
troduction to existing frameworks and procedures for verification of security
properties, along with a discussion on the advantages of applying the verifi-
cation procedures at the different stages of the software life cycle. In Sec. 3
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we introduce our methodology. In Sec. 4 we apply the different phases of our
methodology to three different protocols (MANA III, WEP-SKA and CHAT-
SRP), and we conclude this work in Sec. 5, with a global perspective of the
benefits provided by our methodology.
2 Related work and discussion
Security flaws in information systems are receiving increasing attention, as the
problems and losses they can cause grow in severity [29, 30, 33]. As a result,
organizations are paying more attention to the design of secure systems. In
that matter, several frameworks have been developed during the last years,
intended to help in the task of creating secure software by delimiting where
can security flaws be originated [31, 22, 25]. There are also proposals and
standards defining different security levels that may be required depending on
the context and managed information, and even the methods and tools used
for verification [1, 27]. While [31, 22, 1] are aimed for every software system
and all the components within it, the proposal in [27] is centered in evaluating
security in cryptographic protocols. Certainly, cryptographic protocols are quite
important for the evaluation of security properties, since they are applied when
something is required to be protected. Moreover, protocols can be seen as
components that need special consideration when evaluating security because
they are subject to specific risks that can hardly take place in other components
(e.g., replay, spoofing or Man In The Middle attacks). In the mentioned work,
several levels of security are defined, depending on the level of formalization
applied in the different elements of the methodology (protocol specification,
adversarial model, security properties and self-assessment evidence), and the
type of tools used in the process. Indeed, we shall refer to them [27, Sec. 2.1]
for a good review of the different type of formal methods and tools that can be
used for cryptographic protocols analysis.
Besides the classification of verification tools in terms of the theory they
are based upon, there is yet another further division: the point in the software
development life cycle where they are applied. Precisely, they can be applied
to check the design obtained after the design phase; or to check the code cre-
ated during the implementation phase. Examples of tools for verification at
the design phase are ProVerif, CryptoVerif, CertiCrypt, Cryptyc, AVISPA and
Isabelle [8, 9, 5, 4, 12, 28]. On the other hand, examples of code verifiers are
[7, 11, 21]. As usual, there are supporters for each of the different alternatives.
Our point of view is that neither of them should be neglected, for the following
reasons. Imagine that we just choose to apply a verification tool directly to
the obtained system implementation, and we indeed find security flaws. Now
suppose that, while trying to fix them, we realize that one (or several) of them
is not just a coding flaw, but a design flaw. That means that we must go back to
the design phase and fix the flaw at that stage. Moreover, if the flaw is serious
enough, the existing implementation may need extensive changes, which will
incur in unacceptable costs and delays. Yet another disadvantage is that code
2
verification obviously relies on the existence of a tool for verifying the specific
programming language that has been used. Although these tools are gaining
popularity, the huge number of existing programming languages, along with the
complexity of creating such a tool, suggests that, in the real world, we should
not trust in having always a code verification tool suitable to our needs. On
the other hand, deciding just to apply a verification tool to test if our design is
robust does not guarantee that the implementation of that design will also be
secure even though the design seems to be so. However it is technology inde-
pendent. Thus, we argue that verification of the security properties of both the
design and its implementation should be applied when possible.
We propose here a simple, but yet powerful, methodology for the verification
of the design of communication protocols. Thus, we keep in mind the specific
risks that we can encounter when desiging them, but set aside the more general
software flaws that, although can ultimately affect the security properties of
the protocols, should be dealt with by the tools applied for code verification.
As a methodology, its main advantage is that it is directly devised to help
detecting simple flaws early in the design process, leaving only the complex,
time-consuming ones for the last steps. Thus, it avoids wasting too much time
in flaws that could have been easily detected. It also allows reaching the highest
levels of assurance of other frameworks, like [27, 1], depending on the tools used
for procedural verification.
3 The methodology
Our methodology consists of two main parts, like shown in Fig. 1. The first
part is concerned with specifying the security requirements and considering if
they are suitable in a given context, and performing a first informal verification;
while the second part is centered in the formalization and formal verification of
the protocol itself.
3.1 Analysis of security context and informal verification
This is the first part of the methodology and is mainly intended to avoid in-
congruences related to security requirements unachievable or inappropriate for
some reason, and to improve our understanding of the protocol. It also allows
us to perform several informal checks of our first design candidates. This part is
depicted in the first phase of Fig. 1. Namely, here we face the following matters:
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. This step might seem too obvious to be needed,
but specifying the goals of the protocol will help to improve the under-
standing of the protocol, and will also come in handy for the third and
fourth steps. As output here, we will get a rather informal specification
of what we intend to achieve with our protocol, something like “Complete
certainty that the person being registered in our website is who he/she says
he/she is”.
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Figure 1: Steps of the proposed methodology. From the initial design of the pro-
tocol, the first phase consists of performing an analysis of its goals, the security
model that best fits our needs a design candidate, and the trust requirements
we expect to achieve. During the second phase, after giving informal and formal
definitions of the protocol, we apply the chosen tools or models for the verifica-
tion of the security requirements established before. Note that the methodology
is structured as a loop, which is repeated as long as new context, protocol errors
are detected.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. This step is essential,
because depending on the capabilities the attacker has, some security re-
quirements might or might not be achievable. In this sense, there are two
main attacker models: the Dolev-Yao attacker [17] and the computational
attacker [6]. The Dolev-Yao attacker model assumes perfect cryptographic
primitives but gives otherwise full control to the attacker over the commu-
nications network. The computational attacker is somehow more realistic
in that it is assumed to be a Probabilistic Polynomial-time Turing Ma-
chine. But, as a matter of fact, we are also worried about other attacker
capabilities, like the capability to access public records containing personal
information assumed to be secret in the protocol like Facebook pages, lists
of personal passwords published by hackers or leaked, etc.). Indeed, this
kind of information is usually assumed to be secret in the typical attacker
models, and it can drastically change the provided security guarantees.
On the other hand, we might find ourselves in a situation where all the
capabilities of the typical Dolev-Yao or computational attacker do not
hold. So, in short, here we have to ask ourselves whether the assumptions
made by standard attacker models are close to our reality, or if we need to
adjust them in some way. May we ignore this step, any later proof might
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be wrong because our initial assumptions were not close to our reality [3].
As a result, with this step we will get a specification of the attacker model,
e.g. Dolev-Yao or computational, along with a list of specific capabilities
added or subtracted to it, like “Knows the home address of everyone that
may be involved in the protocol” or “Cannot eavesdrop wired communi-
cations”. Henceforth, we will refer to this list as the “+/- capabilities”
list.
Step 3. Design candidate. Once we have made up our mind as to which are
the goals of our protocol and the attacker capabilities and security model
we assume, we can adventure ourselves to cast a design candidate. For
communications protocols, a sequence diagram is most commonly used,
since it captures both the order of the messages composing the protocol
and their contents. Therefore, as output of this step we will obtain a
sequence diagram depicting the protocol.
Step 4. Trust requirements. This step of the methodology is the first part
of an informal verification procedure. Besides helping us in checking the
security requirements, it is also intended to prevent us from wasting our
efforts needlessly. Before undertaking the formal verification task, which
may be time consuming, it is worth making a simpler manual verification,
in order to detect obvious mistakes. For that purpose, we will follow the
design candidate from the beginning, asigning trust properties. Note that
we use the term trust property rather than security property because at
this point, this properties are something we expect the elements to keep,
not something we state that they have. The procedure is as follows: for
each step of the sequence diagram, we will note down the trust properties
we expect from every of its elements to keep. If, within a specific step,
we apply some function to merge several elements or disassemble them,
we may have to require additional trust properties to the result (e.g.,
a message containing the a priori unauthenticated elements x1, x2 along
with MACK(x1, x2) can be considered authenticated, by the holder of
a key K, if the MAC verification suceeds, provided that the key K is
trusted)1. Since the properties we require from a specific element may
change through the protocol, we will revise them for every step, even
if the element has already been processed previously. This process is
summarized in Algorithm 1. Also, the requirements that we may need to
apply to the different elements are2:
None. When a field does not require any specific trust property.
Authenticity. When the authenticity of the field must be guaranteed.
Confidentiality. When the specific field must be kept secret.
1Typically, this kind of rules are specified formally inside formal verification tools (e.g.,
Cryptyc [4] is based in type deduction rules). However, since this step is intended to be a
preliminary informal approach, common sense and experience are enough.
2Although we propose this five requirements, more could be defined if necessary.
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Integrity. When the integrity of the field must be preserved. Detecting
any undesired modifications.
Uniqueness. When an element cannot be repeated among the same or
different protocol runs. This property is commonly used to guarantee
freshness and avoid replay attacks.
Data: The sequence diagram of the protocol.
Result: A set of trust requirements for each protocol step.
for s = first step; until s = last step do
for e = first until e = last element of step s do
Set reqs[s][e];
end
reqs[s] += Additional trust requirements for step s;
end
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for assigning requirements to protocol elements and
messages. With elements, we refer to any component calculated or sent within
each specific step.
Therefore, as output of this step we get a list of trust requirements which,
optionally, can be depicted jointly with the sequence diagram to create a
requirement-tagged sequence diagram of our protocol design candidate.
Besides, we also have to decide in this step which verification tool or
process we will apply in the second phase. Now that we know our specific
trust requirements, we can choose an appropriated tool, since some tools
may not be applicable (depending on the security properties we want to
verify).
Step 5. Informal verification. Now we have to take the +/- capabilities list
and the list of trust requirements (or the requirement tagged sequence
diagram, whichever representation we are using). If any of the trust re-
quirements enters in conflict with any of the capabilities we granted to the
attacker, then we have a security failure. If not, we have informally veri-
fied the design candidate and we can continue. However, we must keep in
mind that this does not guarantee that the design will also pass the next
phase of the methodology.
After applying our methodology up to this point for verifying a protocol,
and assuming we passed the step 5, we would have reached the assurance level
PAL1 defined in [27].
3.2 Procedural verification of security
This part of the methodology is devoted to the procedural verification of the
security requirements established before. It is depicted in the second phase of
Fig. 1. With procedural verification we refer to the fact that widely approved
theories, methods or procedures should be applied here. Again, we can apply
either the formal or the computational model. The main advantage of the formal
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methods is that there are plenty of tools that automatically analyze a protocol
formalization. On the other hand, the computational model verification takes
into account that the cryptographic primitives may not be perfect. However,
in the last years, there has been a lot of work to prove that formal security
implies computational security [2, 24], given that the cryptographic primitives
meet some properties. We do not enter in this matter here, and just assume that
a “procedural” verification model has been adopted and is going to be applied.
Indeed, the aim of our methodology is to formally tackle the verification of the
security properties of communication protocols. Nevertheless, we have found
that the application of automatic tools (like ProVerif [8], Cryptyc [4], etc.)
allows to detect many flaws with little effort, so it may be a good choice to first
apply formal methods and, if required, after that, use the computational model
for more concrete evaluation.
Therefore, the steps we have included in this phase are as follows:
Step 6. Protocol pseudocode In the same way that writing pseudocode is
useful before coding a program, writing an informal narration of a proto-
col in the shape of pseudocode, helps to reach a higher concretion level
before properly formalizing it. As output of this step we get a written
representation of the sequence diagram, with one process for each princi-
pal, which depicts the internal computations performed by each of them
in order to generate the messages’ components, along with the messages
sent to the other principals.
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol From the protocol pseudocode, it
is typically easy to produce a formalization in the language or definition
model required by the tools we are going to use to verify the protocol
(the ones we decided to use in step 4). The result of this step must be a
meticulous representation of how the protocol will be, once implemented.
Step 8. Procedural verification The formalization obtained in the previous
step will then be used as input for the chosen procedural verification model
or tool. If the tools or procedures followed in this step “output” that all
requirements are fulfilled, we can conclude. If not, we have to go back to
the first step and correct protocol errors in our design, checking also for
coding errors in the formalization.
As an end note, we must point out that the methodology does not give
as output an explicit measure of security of the analysed protocol, other than
checking whether the specified security requirements are held. That will de-
pend on the tools or the models used to verify the protocol. In any case, at
least, we will obtain an answer to whether or not the protocol meets the re-
quirements specified in step 4 of our methodology. Again referencing [27], any
protocol successfully verified using our methodology would reach an assurance
level equivalent to PAL2 or PAL3, depending on whether the used tool provides
bounded or unbounded verification (or even the - yet under consideration in [27]
- PAL4 level, would we have used a computational model verification tool).
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To summarize, the inputs and outputs of each of the different steps of our
methodology are shown in Tables 2 and 3, corresponding to the first and second
phases of the methodology. The acronyms used in the tables for the different
outputs are explained in Table 1.
O1: Informal list of goals.
O2: Security model and +/- capabilities list.
O3: Sequence diagram.
O4: List of trust requirements / Requirement-tagged sequence diagram.
O5: Pseudocode.
O6: Formalization.
Table 1: Definition of the different outputs of the methodology.
Goals
Attacker model Design Trust Informal
and capabilities candidate requirements verification
Input: None None O1 O3 O2 and O4
Output: O1 O2 O3 O4 Yes/No
Table 2: Inputs and outputs of each step of the first phase of the methodology.
Pseudocode Formalization
Formal
verification
Input: O4 O2 and O5 O6
Output: O5 O6 Yes/No
Table 3: Inputs and outputs of each step of the second phase of the methodology.
4 Case studies of real security protocols
In this section we provide three case studies by applying our methodology to
real security protocols. For the first case, a problem is located in the first phase
of the methodology, while in the second case, a problem is detected with a
formal analysis in the second phase.3 In the other hand, in the third case, we
go through the whole methodology to verify one more protocol [16, 15] which
successfully passes our tests.
3It is not our purpose to present new flaws here. We rather intend to show how to avoid
security design flaws using our methodology.
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4.1 Case study I: context verification failure
Here we apply the first part of the methodology to the MANA III (MANual
Authentication) authentication protocol [20]. MANA III is intended for wireless
networks and bases its security in the requirement of manually introducing a
short bitstring (R in Fig. 2) via keypads, previous to the execution, which is
kept secret. Since this short secret bitstring is used in the calculation of MACs,
an attacker will not be able to create fake MACs for authentication in real time.
The MANA III protocol is informally depicted in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Message sequence of the MANA III protocol [20]. (1) Devices A and B
agree on some data D (e.g., using Diffie-Hellman). (2) A secretly shared short
random bitstring known in both devices with a keypad. (3-8) Both devices
independently generate a key, compute a MAC of their identities, D and R
and send the result to each other. (9-10) Both devices exchange the keys used
in the previous MACs. (11-14) Both devices check if the received MACs are
correct, and inform the other device of the obtained result. Messages 5,8,9 and
10 are sent over insecure channels, while messages 13 and 14 are sent over an
authenticated channel.
9
In [32] the authors suggest that this authentication method is no longer
secure due to the proliferation of CCTV cameras. Indeed, such cameras can
be used to observe the short bitstring introduced via the keypad. If the secret
short random bitstring becomes known to the attacker, he could use it to mount
a Man In The Middle attack [32]. Let us now see how this fact could have been
detected with the first part of our methodology.
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. We want to achieve a final state in wich De-
vice A and Device B are certain that they are communicating with each
other. That is directly translated to authenticity. Thus, our specific goals
are:
1. Device A is successfully authenticated against Device B.
2. Device B is successfully authenticated against Device A.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. Here we have to de-
cide an attacker model, let us assume that we adopt the Dolev-Yao at-
tacker model (nevertheless, this decision does not affect what follows). As
we said in Sec. 3.1 we have to analyze our specific context to see if our
attacker would have some extra capabilities (or if we have to take out some
capability from him). In the MANA III protocol, and given the current
state of development of CCTV cameras, like it is said in [32], it is not safe
to assume that, in any situation, a password introduced via a keypad will
always remain secret. One could also make a quick search on the Internet
and find several microcameras of roughly 15x5 milimiters. With cameras
that small, an attacker could manage to record almost anything without
the victim even noticing. Therefore, the more realistic decision of giving
the attacker the capability to observe keyed passwords seems to be jus-
tified4. Besides, we will trust that the assumption made by the authors
of the protocol stating that the short random string R prevents attackers
from finding, in real time, collisions for the calculated MACs. Summariz-
ing, we use the Dolev-Yao model, and our +/- capability list will be as
shown in Listing 1
+ May observe keystrokes.
− Cannot find MAC collisions in real-time without R.
Listing 1: +/- capabilities list for the Dolev-Yao attacker for the MANA III
protocol.
Step 3. Design candidate. From the goals we defined in the first step, we
come up with a design candidate in the shape of a sequence diagram.
Suppose that we produce the diagram in Fig. 25.
4However, this may be a too restrictive scenario for many situations, but for illustration
purposes, we will assume that we intend to use MANA-III in a security critical context.
5Obviously, in a real scenario, we will produce it at this step, and not before. We just
showed the diagram in advance for introducing the case study.
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Step 4. Trust requirements. With the sequence diagram in front of us, we
apply Algorithm 1. As a result, we obtain the list of trust requirements
shown in Listing 2 (we omit the complete process for brevity).
Initialization . A and B are pub l i c l y known va lues .
Step 1 . D : Authent i c i ty
Step 2 . R : Con f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 3 . K1 : C on f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 4 . m1 = MACK1(A,D,R) : Authent i c i ty
( K1 is t ru s t ed by A s i n c e she has
created i t . )
Step 5 . m1 : None
( At t h i s point , no one knows K1 and m1
is s ent over the public channel , so we
cannot p lace any t ru s t in t h i s element . )
Step 6 . K2 : C on f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 7 . m2 = MACK2(B,D,R) : Authent i c i ty
( K2 is t ru s t ed by B s i n c e she has
created i t . )
Step 8 . m1 : None
( At t h i s point , no one knows K2 and m2
is s ent over the public channel , so we
cannot p lace any t ru s t in t h i s element . )
Step 9 . K1 : None
( The used cannel is i ns ecure , anyone can
send th i s . )
Step 10 . K2 : None
( The used cannel is i ns ecure , anyone can
send th i s . )
Step 11 . Nothing to do here .
Step 12 . Nothing to do here .
Step 13 . checkm2 : Authent i c i ty .
Step 14 . checkm1 : Authent i c i ty .
Listing 2: List of trust requirements for MANA III.
Step 5. Informal verification. Going through the list of trust requirements
shown in Listing 2 we soon find an incompatibility with the attacker capa-
bilities: in the second step, we see that we require R to be secret (confiden-
tiality). Still, we gave the attacker the capability to observe keystrokes,
and since R is entered in Devices A and B via a keypad, we cannot consider
it secret.
We should see now the importance of this part of the methodology, and
why does it have to be applied with care. Although the standard attacker
models provide a powerful framework to start with, there are cases where these
models do not cover all the possibilities that the attacker may have available.
Therefore, in order to detect possible flaws on the context of the protocol, we
have to carefully establish the protocol goals, analyze the attacker capabilities
given the current technologies, give a formal statement of the required security
properties, and check if they hold given the previous facts. Once we successfully
complete this phase, we can proceed with the second phase of the methodology,
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with a higher degree of certainty that we are correctly grounded the context of
our protocol.
4.2 Case study II: procedural security verification failure
We dedicate this subsection to the procedural analysis of the Shared Key Au-
thentication of the WEP standard (WEP-SKA from now on), as defined in [23].
Let us then assume that the protocol successfully passes the first phase of our
methodology. In this case, we apply the automatic formal verifier ProVerif [8].
The WEP-SKA protocol is one of the two authentication methods supported
by the WEP standard. A normal execution consists of four messages, between
two stations. We will call them the Wireless Device (WD), which wants to be
authenticated, and the Access Point (AP) which attends the WD’s request. A
typical protocol run is depicted in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Message sequence of the WEP-SKA protocol [23]. (1) The WD re-
quests to be authenticated usingWEP-SKA. (2-3) The AP generates a challenge,
and sends it, in plaintext, to WD. (4-5) The WD encrypts the challenge with
a preshared key, and sends the result to the AP. (6-7) The checks the received
encrypted challenge and informs WD of the result.
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the WEP standard [23] sending both the
challenge and its encrypted version may produce a security problem. This is due
to the fact that the encryption algorithm used (RC4) is a stream cipher which
generates a pseudorandom sequence and XORs it to the plaintext in order to
create the ciphertext. Therefore, if we know the ciphertext and the plaintext, we
can obtain the keystream straightaway. Nevertheless, in the standard it was only
advised (but not required) to change the key and/or IV (Initialization Vector)
frequently. Therefore, as observed in [10] the fact of not being required to change
the key/IV, indirectly forces every receiver to accept repeated key/IV’s, or risk
otherwise not being compatible with some WEP compliant devices. That allows
an attacker to successfully impersonate any station after having observed one
single authentication. In [10] they call this attack Authentication spoofing.
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Let us now forget for a moment that this flaw is known, suppose that we
are asked to verify the security of WEP-SKA, and that it successfully passes
the first part of our methodology. Then we would have to face the procedural
verification of the protocol. The steps defined in Sec. 3.2 are as follows:
Step 6. Protocol pseudocode. The pseudocode for the WEP-SKA protocol
is given in Listing 3.
Process WD :
send (MA,AUTH, ( id , ’ shared key ’ , 1 ) ) ;
receive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 2 , i n f o , r e s u l t ) ) ;
i f r e s u l t == su c e s s f u l then
cha l = i n f o ;
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 3 ,{chal}k ) ) ;
f i
receive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 4 , r e s u l t ) ) ;
Process AP :
receive (MA,AUTH, ( id , ’ shared key ’ , 1 ) ) ;
i f s u c c e s s f u l then
r e s u l t = s u c e s s f u l ;
cha l = new pseudorandom ;
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 2 , chal , r e s u l t ) ) ;
receive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 3 ,{chal2}k ) ) ;
i f {chal2}k == {chal}k then
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 4 , s u c e s s f u l ) )
f i
f i
Listing 3: Pseudocode for the WEP-SKA procedures. WD stands from the
Wireless Device to be authenticated, AP stands from Acces Point and k is the
shared key. For simplicity, it is only shown the pseudocode for a successful
execution. The field info conveys information dependent on the authentication
algorithm, and result stores the result of the requested authentication. MA,
AUTH, ’shared key’ and the numbers used in the messages are fields specified
in the standard, see [23]
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol. ProVerif has a problem here, be-
cause it does not support the XOR opperation6.Nevertheless, since we
don’t need to apply complex derivation rules, we can get around this prob-
lem with a simple reduction rule simulating the XOR. This workaround
can be seen in the code of the program available in [14], and is a rule
telling that if the attacker knows both the challenge c, and the challenge c
encrypted (i.e., xored) with the key k, then he can apply the xor function
to recover the key k.
Step 8. Procedural verification. Once we have formalized the protocol, we
run the tool to see if it succeeds or fails. In our case, running ProVerif
with the code in [14], we observe a trace like the one shown in Listing 4.
6Although there are approaches for XOR-aware modifications of ProVerif. See [26].
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WEP-SKA between legitimate WD1 and AP :
WD1 → AP : WD1
AP → WD1 : Chall1
WD1 → AP : {Chall1}k
Attacker : k = Chall1 ⊕ {Chall1}k =⇒ Attacker ga ins k
AP → WD1 : OK
WEP-SKA between illegitimate fakeWD2 and AP :
fakeWD2 → AP : fakeWD2
AP → fakeWD2 : Chall2
fakeWD2 → AP : {Chall2}k
AP → fakeWD2 : OK
Listing 4: An example attack trace found by ProVerif for the Authentication
spoofing attack over WEP-SKA introduced in [10]. In the first block, the at-
tacker eavesdrops on a WEP-SKA run between a legitimate WD and the AP.
As a result, the attacker obtains the preshared key k. In the second block, the
attacker uses the key k in order to successfully complete a WEP-SKA execution
with the AP.
Since we have found an attack during the procedural verification with
ProVerif, the requirements are not fulfilled. Therefore, we must go back
to the first stage of the methodology once we have checked that no coding
error has been made and redesign the protocol to avoid this attack. For
instance, we could proceed like the authors of [10] suggest, which is to
disallow the reuse of IVs in order to avoid this attack.
4.3 Case study III: complete verification
Now we shortly show how the full methodology is applied to the analysis of
the protocol that was informally presented in [16], and whose formal security
verification is performed in [15]. While applying our methodology, we found
flaws in the design of the protocol that could lead to, for instance, replay attacks.
Here we will just summarize the procedure followed (for further details, see [15]).
The protocol is called CHAT-SRP (CHAos based Tickets - Secure Registration
Protocol), and it is intended to be used in registration protocols for interactive
platforms. The typical registration method used in these platforms requires
the new users to provide an email address, verifying their identity when they
access a link included in an email sent to the provided address7. This approach,
although very user-friendly, is very insecure, because emails are almost always
sent unprotected [18]. Therefore, an attacker may impersonate a user just by
eavesdropping the activation email. CHAT-SRP generates a ticket (basically,
a pseudo-random number), links it to the requesting user email, and sends it
encrypted via HTTPS. The user, who is initially identified as being the owner
of a mobile number (which we assume to be previously known and verified),
besides accessing the activation link sent by email, has to provide the right
ticket in order to validate his new account. This way we confirm that who
7This is known as EBIA, [19].
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requested the registration is the one completing it. Once confirmed his identity,
the protocol sends the new user a digital identity, which he could later use for
performing robust cryptographic operations. Let us use our methodology to
analyze it.
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. We want to register new users, providing
them with new virtual identities to be used in the platform. Therefore,
our more formally stated goals are:
1. Authenticate a user requesting registration.
2. Provide him/her a digital identity, keeping the identity’s confidential-
ity and guaranteeing its authenticity (i.e., that it has been generated
by a suitable Certification Authority).
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. We assume the typi-
cal of the Dolev-Yao attacker. Note that this includes the capability of
eavesdropping and blocking emails, which, as we said before, is our main
concern. Besides, we also assume that our attacker can search in the In-
ternet for the necessary information to start a registration process (in this
case, a username and an email). Thus, our +/- capabilities list is shown
in Listing 5.
+ Knows all the information required for registrationfor every user subject to
be registered (username and email).
Listing 5: +/- capabilities list for the Dolev-Yao attacker for the CHAT-SRP
protocol.
Step 3. Design candidate. A sequence diagram for the protocol informally
described at the beginning of this subsection is shown in Fig. 4, and we
will use it as our design candidate. Keep in mind that, for brevity, we
only show the result of several iterations of the methodology. Also, in this
diagram and in the subsequent analysis, WS stands for Web Server, RA
for Registration Authority and CA for Certification Authority. The three
of them are assumed to be trusted authorities.
Step 4. Trust requirements. Applying Algorithm 1 to the elements in dia-
gram in Fig. 4, we obtain the trust requirements in Listing 6.
Step 1 . username : None
user@email . dom : None
Step 2 . code : Uniqueness , au then t i c i t y , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 3 . username : None
code : Uniqueness , au then t i c i t y , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 4 . username : None
code : Uniqueness , au then t i c i t y , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 5 . Ticket Request : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 6 . t i c k e t : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 7 . t i c k e t : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 8 . l i n k : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
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User WS
2. code = nonce
8. Generate activation link
11. Check activation link
RA
6. Generate ticket
13. Check ticket
CA
15. Generate ID
1. username, user@email.dom
3. username,code
4. username,code
5. Ticket Request
7. ticket
9.1. ticket
9.2. activation link
10.1. Access activation link
10.2. ticket
12. ticket
14. ID Request
16. ID
17. ID
18. ID
Figure 4: Sequence diagram of the protocol messages. The dashed lines rep-
resent unprotected communications; the thin continuous ones represent SSL
protected communications, and the thick continuous line represents the mes-
sage sent using the extra authenticated channel (SMS). Although not shown in
the diagram for readability, the ticket is generated as the hash of a nonce and
the user’s email.
Step 9.1 . t i c k e t : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 9.2 . l i n k : Authentic i ty , uniqueness
Step 10.1 . l i n k : None
Step 10.2 . t i c k e t : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 11 . Nothing to do here
Step 12 . t i c k e t : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 13 . Nothing to do here
Step 14 . ID Request : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
Step 15 . ID : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 16 . ID : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 17 . ID : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
Step 18 . ID : Authentic i ty , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , uniqueness
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Listing 6: List of trust requirements for CHAT-SRP.
Basically, at steps 1, 3 and 4, we are considering the extra capability added
to our attacker in our +/- capabilities list. Also, note that the activation
link, when created in step 8 is required authenticity and uniqueness (the
confidentiality requirement is just a consequence of having just been cre-
ated). However, in step 9.2 it is sent via email (an insecure channel),
thus confidentiality cannot be assumed. Moreover, the link is sent at step
10.2 (which simulates the access to the corresponding web site) cannot
be assumed to be confidential, nor unique, nor authenticated, since it can
be originated from anywhere. The ticket and ID are expected to be kept
authenticated, secret and unique, since they are always conveyed through
SSL-secured channels.
Since we have required the protocol to provide secrecy, authenticity and
uniqueness, we decided to use ProVerif, which allows to check all the stated
properties.
Step 5. Informal verification. Going through all the steps in Listing 6 we
do not find any inconsistency with the attacker capabilities nor the +/-
capabilities list specified before. Moreover, we have taken into account
the attacker’s capability to know all the personal information required to
initiate a registration request (since we have place no trust requirement in
the username and email elements in steps 1, 3 and 4). For the remaining
steps, the required trust properties are consistent with the properties of the
channels used to conveyed the associated elements (we must remark here
that the WS, RA and CA are trusted authorities). Thus, we can continue,
considering that our design successfully passes our informal verification
step.
Step 6. Protocol seudocode. For brevity, we do not include the pseudocode
here. Instead, it is accessible from [13]. Note that, again, it was obtained
after several iterations of our methodology, in which we detected and cor-
rected security flaws.
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol. In step 4 we decided to use ProVerif
for verification. From the pseudocode, it is not hard to obtain a formaliza-
tion for ProVerif. For further details on the formalization of the protocol,
see [15] or the pseudocode and formalization for ProVerif in [13].
Step 8. Procedural verification. Running ProVerif on the code in [13] shows
no violation on the security requirements. Therefore, we can assume that
they have been accomplished.
Therefore, following our methodology, as we have briefly shown, CHAT-SRP
is seen to fulfill our secrecy, authenticity and uniqueness requirements.
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5 Conclusion
In this work we have designed a methodology for verifying security properties of
communication protocols. It is mainly divided in two parts, the first one devoted
to a preliminary study of the properties of the context where the protocol will
be applied, its security requirements and an informal verification. The second
part is dedicated to a procedural verification of these security requirements,
applying well-known and widely accepted tools and/or procedures. By adopting
an iterative methodology in which the early processes are less time consuming,
we avoid wasting resources by increasing the probability of detecting basic flaws
at the beginning of the analysis. We also provide three examples in order to
help to understand which are the advantages of applying this methodology.
These examples (MANA III, WEP-SKA and CHAT-SRP) are representative,
since they are real protocols that have been presented to the community, and
specially in the case of WEP-SKA, widely used. Note that the first two examples
study already known security flaws. However, our aim is not to detect new flaws,
but to show how our methodology can be applied and the benefits of doing so.
We would like to remark that, when designing and evaluating communica-
tion protocols, the application of such a methodology helps to detect and avoid
flaws that can lead to attacks on the protocols, like we have shown. It is im-
portant to note that both phases of the methodology are required: if the first
phase is skipped, a wrong contextualization may render the formalization in-
valid; if, in the other hand, we skip the second phase, most probably we will
not realize several involved nuances that, in turn, can lead to security flaws. By
using what we called procedural methods, like formal protocol verifiers, or the
computational model for the verification of protocols, we can prevent much of
the damage caused by flawed designs. Nevertheless, the human factor also in-
tervenes in the procedural analysis of protocols, and a wrong formalization can
make some flaws to pass unnoticed. Hence, like in every engineering process,
this does not provide a 100% success rate, but it does help to avoid many flaws.
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